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Abstract 
This paper tests the two major capital structure theories; pecking order theory and trade off 
theory, in order to determine how the debt ratios in mining and software industries in Canada 
behave. We used a disaggregated and an aggregated model for the pecking order theory and a 
static adjustment model for the trade off theory. Our results indicate that there is weak support 
for the pecking order theory while the trade off theory is relevant for the software industry.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Capital structure is one of the main fields in corporate finance today. Modern corporate capital 
structure theory originated with Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance theorem and 
numerous papers have been written on the subject ever since. Major areas of research within 
capital structure are what factors affect firms’ debt levels and if there is a rationale in how firms 
choose between different financing options. Because of the constraints of Modigliani and Miller’s 
theorem, in perfect capital markets and no taxes, other theories have been developed; trade off 
theory by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) builds on Modigliani and Miller’s theorem with taxes 
included and pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984).  
Trade off theory suggests that capital structure choices are made through a trade off between the 
pros and cons of different leverage levels and Myers (1984) introduced the idea that firms have a 
target debt level. Pecking order theory states that firms avoid external financing in general and 
external equity financing in particular. Since financing decisions does in fact affect firm value it is 
essential to understand the main drivers behind firms’ financial choices.  
The aim of this study is to test if the mining and software industries in Canada follow the pecking 
order theory and/or the trade off theory. Further, we want to test if there is a difference in capital 
structure decisions between the two industries.  
Previous studies have tested if capital structure theories, such as pecking order and trade off 
theories, can accurately explain firms’ financing decisions. Studies have been conducted on a 
number of different industries and indices, and cross-country comparisons have also been made 
(see Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The support for the theories varies depends on the specific 
sample and time period used. This leads us to choose two industries with very different asset 
structure as our sample.  
The sample contains all listed mining and software firms in Canada. Firms within the mining 
industry have high levels of tangible assets that can be used as collateral when leveraging and 
therefore may have greater opportunities to leverage to a low cost. Opposite are software firms 
who have low levels of tangible assets and high levels of human capital and may thus have low 
debt capacity. Many previous studies testing pecking order and trade off theory have been 
conducted on an American sample. Canada is similar to the US in that it is also a market-based 
economy and these generally tend to use less debt and more equity (Dang, 2011). Since Canada 
and the US have the same main characteristics, we are able to compare our result with those of 
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earlier studies using a US sample. Furthermore, Canada is a large country with many mining 
firms; these suffice as a sample to test the theories on. Since Canada is a well-developed 
economy, data is easily accessible for firms in the country.  
Model specifications to test the two theories are developed by e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Helwege and Liang (1996), Frank and Goyal (2003), Flannery and Rangan (2006) and 
Dang (2011). Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) use a static trade off 
model in order to test the theory against pecking order theory. They conclude that the pecking 
order model is more robust than trade off model. Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Dang (2011) 
developed the trade off model further by creating a dynamic model that controls for more 
variables.  
Our study complements previous studies and literature in the area by comparing two industries 
that are believed opposites in terms of level of tangible assets. It contributes with a wider 
understanding of capital structure within the mining and software industries and also how and 
possibly why industries differ in their financial decisions. Furthermore, we include size as a 
variable to be able to compare the differences between small and large firms.  
As a summary of our result, we find support for the trade off theory in small software firms in 
Canada. This could be due to a high growth rate within these firms. The tests for pecking order 
theory provide weak support in both industries and the theory seems to be of minor importance 
in our sample. Finally, it is difficult to conclude whether our results for trade off theory are 
reliable or not due to large variation in coefficient values that depends on how leverage is 
defined. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Corporate capital structure choice first became a major area of research in the beginning of the 
late 1950’s with the emergence of Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) theorem (1958). The theorem 
states that in perfect market without taxes, firm value should be unaffected by the firm’s financial 
decisions. It would not be possible to increase the value of a firm by changing how it is financed. 
In reality, the strong assumptions of no taxes and perfect capital markets, asymmetric 
information and bankruptcy costs rarely holds, which means that in most markets the MM 
theorem does not hold. The theorem does however provide an important theoretical base for 
what factors affect firm value and consequently affect firms’ capital structure decisions. 
The lack of real-life application of MM’s theorem encouraged further research within the subject 
of corporate capital structure choice and through this first trade off theory and then pecking 
order theory evolved. The two theories can either be used as organizing frameworks that help 
explain the rationale behind firms’ financial decisions, or they can be viewed as part of a much 
broader set of factors that define the capital structure of a firm. Frank and Goyal (2007) refers to 
them as point-of-view theories; both give us guidance in the design of models and tests. Neither 
model has a neither definite nor exact model formulation.  
2.1. THE TRADE OFF THEORY  
As the title suggests, it is a trade off between benefits and costs that is the main driver in this 
theory. There is a trade off between the rewards of a tax shield and the disadvantages of costs of 
debt. Taking on large debt ratios in order to get advantages from such a tax shield increases the 
risk of illiquidity, i.e. the firm are not able to pay the interest of the loan, and thereby increases 
the cost of being in financial distress.  
Modigliani and Miller (1963) was the starting point for the traditional version of the static trade 
off theory when they introduced corporate income tax to the original irrelevance theorem. This 
new framework created a benefit of debt by a reduced tax payment. There is a benefit of 
financing with debt – a “tax discount” or a tax shield, as Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) stated. 
Myers (1984) developed the model by introducing a target debt-to-value ratio. He matches the 
debt tax shield against costs of being in financial distress. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and 
Dang (2011) among others have tested these models. Myer’s (1984) target ends up in two 
approaches; static trade off (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999) and dynamic trade off (e.g. 
Dang, 2011). This study uses the static model.  
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The key factors that decide leverage within a static trade off model are taxes and financial costs of 
debt. The managers have to choose a capital structure for the firm and an optimal level of 
leverage is decided to minimize costs and maximize benefits. In other words, marginal costs and 
marginal benefits must be in balance (Frank and Goyal, 2007).     
Historically, debt has been used for financing long before the corporate tax was introduced to the 
model. Hence, we know that taxes cannot fully explain the adjustments to desired debt-equity 
ratio of the firm’s capital structure (Frank and Goyal, 2007).   
Figure 1: Trade Off Theory – The Balance Between Tax Shield and Cost of Financial Distress   
 
 
 
A firm that maximizes its profit, 
which firms in general tend to do, 
operates on the margin, the top of 
the curve, in order to balance the 
tax shield and the costs of 
distress. 
Source: Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
2.2. THE PECKING ORDER THEORY 
The pecking order theory was initially presented by Myers and Majluf (1984), as an attempt to 
explain the reasoning behind firms’ financing decisions. It states that there exists a financing 
hierarchy where internal financing is preferred over external financing and external equity is only 
used as a last resort.  
The theory’s main objective is to emphasize the information asymmetry that exists between the 
managers of a company and potential investors where the managers have an information 
advantage, which in turns creates an adverse selection problem (Myers, 1984; Brealey et al, 2008, 
pp. 517-519). Adverse selection means that due to the information asymmetry, investors are 
unable to make accurate investment decisions based on the information the company conveys. 
Investors deal with the information asymmetry by interpreting the company’s explicit financial 
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strategy, i.e. their use of leverage and equity, and make rational decisions accordingly. (Brealey et 
al, 2008, pp. 517-519) 
Because of the adverse selection problem, certain types of debt are preferred over others; the 
issues of equity has major adverse selection problems, issues of debt less so, and internal 
financing, such as using retained earnings, has no adverse selection problem (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). A promising investment opportunity with a large future payoff would raise a firm’s value. 
To finance this, managers would not want to issue equity since they believe the firm will be worth 
a great deal more after the investment. If they issue equity, it would thus be underpriced, which is 
why potential investors interpret an equity issue as a negative sign that the existing firm shares are 
overpriced (Ross et al, 2010). Equity financing is therefore regarded as more risky by potential 
investors, who will require a higher rate of return after a release of new shares to be willing to 
hold this higher perceived risk.  Firms prefer internal over external financing and only use equity 
as a last resort and a financing hierarchy is consequently created.  
The theory builds on a few important assumptions where firm managers act in the interest of 
existing shareholders. These shareholder are passive and do not adjust current portfolio holdings 
in response to firms’ financing decisions. There is also a mutual understanding between managers 
and investors on the existing information asymmetry where managers have the information 
advantage. The information asymmetry would prevail even if managers managed to convey 
important information to investors. Since the investors may not have complete understanding of 
the firm and market in which it acts they could not fully comprehend and interpret the 
information accurately (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Contrary to what could initially be expected from pecking order theory due to its basic 
assumption of information asymmetry, previous research has found that large firms seem to 
follow the theory to a greater extent than small firms. Small firms should have greater 
information asymmetry costs, which in turn would make them more inclined to issue debt. 
However, in reality this does not seem to be the case (Frank and Goyal, 2003). According to 
Brealey et al (2008, pp. 520-521), large firms tend to have higher debt ratios and the pecking 
order theory seems to be the most accurate for large, mature firms that have access to the public 
bond markets.   
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3. METHOD 
In order to tests the significance of pecking order and trade off theory, this section applies the 
theoretical framework in empirical models. Frank and Goyal (2003) provide us with the model 
specification for pecking order theory and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for trade off theory.   
3.1. THE TRADE OFF MODEL  
This model provides us with a mean reverting, target adjustment model that predicts and gives 
estimates of changes in debt ratios over time.   
The notion of an optimal capital structure for each individual firm is what drives the trade off 
theory. According to the theory, every firm has a target debt level towards which it continually 
reverts (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Driven by the need for external funds the firm strays from 
its target debt level but is continually reverting back towards it since the managers attempt to 
reach or stay at the firm’s optimal capital structure. In other words, by striving towards the firm’s 
optimal capital structure, the debt ratio constantly changes. Following the framework of Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), the trade off theory is tested. The economic hypothesis is that every 
firm has an optimal debt ratio and move towards it, using both debt and equity. 
Table 1: Summary of Variables – Target Adjustment Model 
Variable Definition 
     Change in debt for firm i at time t 
   
  Unobservable target debt level for firm i at time t 
      Debt level in previous time period 
    Speed of adjustment coefficient 
 
A proxy for the target debt level is set to obtain an estimated target debt level for each firm. Two 
different target debt levels are estimated and tested to ensure we get as good proxy as possible. 
The target debt level is defined by (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999):  
Target 1 - Historical mean of the debt ratio1: Debt ratioi multiplied by total capitalit 
Target 2 - Rolling mean for debt ratio2 from historical data (interval of three years):  
                Debt ratioi(t-3)-t multiplied by total capitalit  
                                                          
1 Average total debt for the whole time period divided with average total asset for the whole time period 
2 Average total debt for three-year-period divided with average total assets for three-year-period 
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The estimations are based on book debt amounts and to book ratios expressed as the ratio of 
long-term debt to the book value of assets (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). 
Specifications of the static trade off theory – a target adjustment model: 
          (   
       )                                              
For the firms to have a debt ratio that is mean reverting around target debt level, the following 
must hold: 
       Denoting adjustment towards the target  
       Implying positive adjustment costs 
The theory holds if the adjustment coefficient confidence interval lies within the interval above 
and the constant is close to zero (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999).  
The hypothesis tested is thus: 
            
In other words, do we have a mean reverting process that have an adjustment coefficient that lies 
between zero and unity?  
The adjustment coefficient estimates the proportion of current change in debt from the target 
debt level.  If the firm could adjust to their target debt level instantly, the adjustment coefficient 
must be equal to unity. A coefficient value of zero would indicate no adjustment towards the 
target debt level. According to Dang (2011), we have a relatively quick adjustment towards the 
mean when the coefficient value is between 0.3 and 1. Due to transaction costs when the 
coefficient is between zero and unity the firm has debt adjustment costs when adjusting to target 
debt level (Dang, 2011). 
By not testing a target adjustment model where the target is determined by firm characteristics, 
we deviate from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). The method used is fixed-effects panel 
regression, same as in pecking order theory, because of the apparent problem with 
autocorrelation in the sample.  
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3.2. THE PECKING ORDER MODEL 
According to pecking order theory, after an initial public offering (IPO), a company will rarely 
issue new equity since there are major adverse selection costs with this type of financing and this 
forms the basis of our hypothesis. If the pecking order holds, the firm’s financial deficit or 
surplus should be covered by an equally large increase or decrease in corporate debt, as suggested 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). By constructing a financial deficit variable from its 
components it is possible to evaluate the subsequent deficit’s impact on change in debt. Financial 
deficit arises when a company has had cash outflow due to pay-out of dividends, investments, 
changes in working capital and/or internal cash flow. The economic hypothesis is that firms do 
not use equity and finance deficits (use surpluses) with new debt (to buy back debt). There is no 
optimal debt ratio as in the trade off theory.   
Table 2: Summary of Variables – Pecking Order Model 
Variable Definition 
      Financial deficit for firm i at time t 
      Dividends paid out for firm i during time t 
    Investments for firm i during time t 
      Change in working capital for firm i during time t 
     Internal cash flow for firm i during time t 
     Issue of new debt for firm i at time t 
     Issue of new equity for firm i at time t 
Consequently the firm’s financial deficit consists of: 
                            
If a firm has more cash inflow than outflow, the deficit dependent variable is positive and a 
surplus. The current portion of long-term debt could be included as a variable in the model as 
done by Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999). However, Frank and Goyal (2003) found it to have a 
minimal impact on companies’ financing decisions and has therefore been excluded from the 
current model. If there is a financial deficit it needs to be covered and this can be achieved either 
by internal or external financing, i.e. issue of new debt or equity.  
                
The pecking order states that deficits should be completely financed through the use of debt. If 
there is a surplus instead, this expects to be used to pay off debt. 
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The aim is to test both a disaggregated and aggregated model. The former model is used to 
evaluate the variables’ impact on the issue of new debt to cover a deficit and thereby justify the 
aggregation step. The disaggregated model would thus be: 
                                         
If all variables are found to be statistically significant and a financial deficit is completely financed 
by debt there will be a one-to-one change between the dependent variable and each independent 
variable with the hypothesis being: 
                  
and    , where a rejection of H0 at the chosen significance level means the study fails to find 
support for pecking order theory.   
The aggregated model is: 
                     
where the hypothesis is that the potential deficit is financed completely by debt so there is a one-
to-one relationship between the two: 
          
and    . This hypothesis remains even if there is a surplus instead of a deficit. The surplus is 
then used to pay off existing debt.  
The chosen method is fixed-effects panel regression, as used by Frank and Goyal (2003). 
Wooldridge autocorrelation test was performed and since there were autocorrelation in the 
sample fixed-effects regression is used. Frank and Goyal (2003) have tested different approaches 
and not found any major differences in results and conclusions between them, if you accept the 
classical error assumptions fixed-effects panel regression can be used. The two hypotheses,  
                  and      , are also tested using a Wald test.  
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4. DATA 
The study contains an unbalanced panel of all active software and mining firms listed on the four 
Canadian stock markets for two or more years during the period 1990 to 2011 and their yearly 
statistics. All firms that have been active during the time period in each industry are included in 
the sample to avoid survivorship bias. We also minimize cross-sectional problems by only 
including companies from one country. The yearly financials are retrieved from the database 
Thomson Datastream who gathers and presents information from numerous sources, the 
underlying source for the data used in this study is Worldscope. Canadian yearly inflation rates 
are retrieved from Bank of Canada.  
The complete dataset contains 94 mining and 22 software firms, see Appendix for full list of firm 
names. The sample period starts at 1990 since previous research have shown that firms’ capital 
structure differ between the 1980’s and 1990 onwards (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Furthermore, 
only one firm in the sample has data that starts before the time period and none of the firms are 
liquidated or acquired within the time period of our sample. The one percent of firms with the 
highest and lowest value of average net assets is removed to avoid these to have an abnormally 
large effect on the estimations.  
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) exclude firms that have had major mergers during the time-
period. Major mergers trigger a change in the capital structure that affects the results. We checked 
for this but did not find any major mergers in our dataset that needed to be taken in to 
consideration.    
All firms in the sample have the same annual fiscal year, where the data used is extracted from 
their cash flow and income statements and balance sheets. A majority of the observations are 
expressed as ratios, but those values that are not are deflated by the yearly Canadian inflation rate 
to be expressed in nominal 1990 Canadian dollars.  
In general, scaling is performed in both models to avoid problems with heteroskedasticity as well 
as controlling for firm size. However, the pecking order model does not require it and therefore 
regression with both scaled and ordinary variables is performed, but only regressions with un-
scaled variables are reported. If the scaling variable, in this case book value of net assets, is 
correlated with any of the variables in the equation it could have a major impact on the estimated 
coefficient, which is why scaling should be performed with precaution. (Frank and Goyal, 2003; 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Helwege and Liang, 1996) Previous studies by Frank and Goyal 
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(2003) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) have tried scaling with other variables such as the 
sum of book debt plus market equity and by sales, but not found any significant difference in 
results and conclusions between the methods. 
Regressions will include year dummies as independent variables to remove time trends in both 
models, as done by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). The tests controlling for firm size and 
industry effects in both models will be performed by including interaction terms; size dummy 
multiplied by the independent variable and industry dummy multiplied by the independent 
variable, to see the effect size and industry have on the significance of the models. This technique 
deviates from the technique by Frank and Goyal (2003), who instead divides the data into two 
groups, large and small size firms, based on their median book value of average net assets.  
Our study differs from Frank and Goyal’s (2003) since we have a smaller sample size and only 
study two industries due to time constraints. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and 
Goyal (2003) also test a conventional model to further support their results from the pecking 
order and trade off theories tests. We have chosen not to include this model in our report.   
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS  
5.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
In table 3 we present the summary statistics for the whole sample and both industries.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics  
Software and mining industries. Descriptive statistics for a sample of 116 firms in the mining and software 
industries in Canada for year endings 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The book debt ratio is the ratio of total debt 
as a fraction of total assets. Values are reported in Canadian Dollar.  
 
 Software industry Mining industry 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
No. 
Observations 
1 3 10 20 22 0 1 27 70 89 
Book Value 
of Debt Ratio 
          
Mean 0 0.189 0.052 0.079 0.047 - 0.447 0.047 0.336 0.336 
Median 0 0.236 0 0 0 - 0.447 0.004 0.043 0.027 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 - 0.447 0 0 0 
Max 0 0.332 0.479 1.167 0.474 - 0.447 0.283 3.146 5.599 
Book Value 
of Total 
Assets 
          
Mean 78 424 74 326 28 100 47 255 173 203 - 37 444 102 918 181 135 219 567 
Median 78 424 72 604 10 575 13 289 59 160 - 37 444 30 096 20 917 35 258 
Min 78 424 28 751 0 0 635 - 37 444 6 634 632 205 
Max 78 424 123 344 252 361 773 599 2 462 594 - 37 444 719 251 2 808 366 3 003 021 
Book Value 
of Debt 
          
Mean 0 13 073 2 467 4 793 13 930 - 16 719 5 245 13 267 38 197 
Median 0 17 124 0 0 0 - 16 719 57 1 555 411 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 - 16 719 0 0 0 
Max 0 22 096 41 480 183 546 321 213 - 16 719 34 834 177 979 754 007 
 
When comparing the median and the mean values it is apparent that the data is skewed. There is 
a large difference between the two values where the median usually has a considerably lower 
value than the mean. The median is therefore a more appropriate statistic to use when the sample 
consist of a few high-magnitude observations that drive the sample.  
It is worth noting that the median values on book value of debt, and therefore also book value of 
debt ratio, is zero for all chosen year endings except 1995 for software firms. There are thus a 
few firms that stand for the majority of leveraging in the already small sample. Because the data is 
heavily skewed, the results need to be interpreted with caution. 
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Figure 2: Average Net Debt Issued, Net Equity Issued and Financial Deficit during the Time 
Period 1990-2011 
 
        
Since the pecking order theory predicts firms to solely rely on debt, the financial deficit should 
track net debt issues more closely than net equity issues. Looking at the graph in Figure 2, this 
does not seem to be the case. Neither net debt nor net equity issuance seem to track the deficit 
well, instead firms use a mixture of both to cover their financial needs. Interestingly, both net 
debt and net equity issuance decreases from 1996 to 1999, which means firms pay off part of the 
debt and repurchase equity during that time period. In order to reach an optimal level of debt in 
trade off theory, the firm has the option to either increase or pay off debt. According to pecking 
order theory, if firms achieve a surplus instead of a deficit in their cash flow they use this to pay 
off some of the existing debt. This is done between 1996 and 1999.  
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Net equity issued/Net assets Net debt issued/ Net assets Deficit/Net assets
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Table 4: Corporate Cash Flow 
All figures retrieved from Datastream for year endings in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. Financial deficit equals the 
sum of dividends, investments and change in working capital reduced by internal cash flow. Long-term debt issued 
equals long-term debt issuance reduced by long-term debt reduction. Net equity issued equals equity issuance reduced 
by equity repurchasing. Net external financing equals the sum of long-term debt issued and net equity issued.    
 
 Average Cash Flows Divided by Total Assets 
Year  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
No. Observations 1 5 37 91 111 
Dividends 0.076 0 0 0.002 0.003 
Investments 0 0.122 0.046 0.065 0.073 
Working Capital . – 0.085 0.103 0.010 0.071 
Internal Cash Flow . – 0.004 0.015 0.067 0.056 
Financial Deficit . 0.010 0.151 0.002 0.089 
Long-term Debt Issued . – 0.030 – 0.106 0.004 – 0.019 
Net Equity Issued . 0.257 – 0.060 0.005 0.129 
Net External Financing . 0.227 – 0.166 0.009 0.110 
 
When looking at the corporate cash flows in table 4 we can see that dividends are only a fraction 
of firms’ cash flows. Also, both long-term debt and net equity decreased in the year 2000. This 
should be due to firms buying back equity and paying off debt.  
Since previous studies that we refer to have used a different database (Compustat) than the one 
used to retrieve the data in this study (Datastream), there may be slight differences in how the 
variables are defined. This could potentially affect our results, but should not be major enough to 
affect the conclusions. To make our definitions as clear as possible, all variables are defined in 
Appendix.   
We have the same problem with biasness towards listed firms in our sample as Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999). By using Datastream as a resource our sample only contains publicly traded 
firms. This means that our sample excludes private and unlisted firms and thereby is biased. The 
question we need to think trough is if we can apply our result to the chosen industries as a whole 
or just publicly traded. Therefore, it is s possibility that our sample does not represent the mining 
and software industries as a whole.      
5.2. THE TRADE OFF THEORY 
By following the methodology of basic tests by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), the trade off 
theory is tested. Test results for the target adjustment model are presented in Panel A and Panel 
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B of Table 5. Firms with gaps3 in the necessary cash flows and outliers have been removed. In 
Appendix, correlation tables and a list of all firms are presented. 
Table 5: Target Adjustment Model 
Mining and software industries. The sample period is 1990-2011. The estimated regression is:        
   (   
       )                                                                    . 
Panel A provides us with results for Target 1 and Panel B for Target 2.       has two definitions: debt issued (long-
term debt issuance – long-term debt reduction) and change of net debt (total debt – cash).    
  has two definitions: 
Target 1 is the debt ratio multiplied with total capital, Target 2 equals a three year rolling average of debt ratio multiplied with total 
capital. Debt ratio is the total debt divided with the total assets for firm i.       is the debt level for the previous time period, 
i.e. long term debt level at time t-1. (   
       ) is the difference between target and debt level for previous time period. All 
variables are scaled with net assets (total capital - deferred tax- minority interests - long term debt). 1990 is the base 
year and 1991, 1992, …, 2011 are year dummies for years 1991 to 2011.      is a size dummy where the reference 
group is small firms with average net assets above 40 000 Canadian Dollar.    is an industry dummy where the mining 
industry is the reference group. The interaction variables           and         are the dummy variables multiplied by 
(   
       ) for target 1 and 2. All variables are in book value. Definitions are taken from Datastream. The tests are 
estimated with an Ordinary Least Square fixed-effects panel regression. 
 
Panel A Target 1 – Target Adjustment Model with Size and Firm Dummies 
Industry Mining Industry Software Industry Both industries 
Variable Debt Issued/ 
Net Assets 
 
 
(1) 
 
Change in 
Net Debt/ 
Net Assets 
 
(2) 
Debt Issued/ 
Net Assets 
 
 
(3) 
Change in 
Net Debt/ 
Net Assets 
 
(4) 
Debt Issued/ 
Net Assets 
 
 
(5) 
Change in 
Net Debt/ 
Net Assets 
 
(6) 
Constant, α 0.099* 0.650 0.164** -0.024 0.122* 0.064 
(std. err) (0.030) (0.479) (0.069) (0.211) (0.028) (0.249) 
Difference, βTO 
(   
       ) 
0.001 1.300* 0.025* 0.482* 0.234** 0.999* 
(std. err) (0.022) (0.013) (0.004) (0.010) (0.102) (0.130) 
Confidence Interval (-0.042;  0.044) (1.270; 1.323) (0.016; 0.033) (0.459; 0.505) (0.031; 0.438) (0.739; 1.260) 
SIZE_DIFF, β24 0.238** -0.313* -0.385 -0.863 -0.233** 0.328** 
(std. err) (0.110) 0.118 (0.464) (1.139) (0.104) (0.136) 
IT_DIFF, β25 . . . . 0.024 -0.845* 
(std. err) . . . . (0.022) (0.033) 
R2 within 0.046 0.581 0.133 0.784 0.044 0.758 
R2 between 0.000 0.006 0.013 0.298 0.008 0.031 
R2 overall 0.029 0.404 0.102 0.728 0.024 0.684 
N 571 168 164 101 735 269 
* = significant at 1% level,       ** = significant at 5% level,      *** = significant at 10% level 
 
  
                                                          
3 Since the trade off model requires a continuous dataset, firms with gaps in the net asset variable 
are removed from the sample.  
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Panel B Target 2 – Target Adjustment Model with Size and Firm Dummies 
Industry Mining Industry Software Industry Both industries 
Variable Debt Issued/ 
Net Assets 
 
 
(1) 
 
Change in 
Net Debt/ 
Net Assets 
 
(2) 
Debt Issued/ 
Net Assets 
 
 
(3) 
Change in 
Net Debt/ 
Net Assets 
 
(4) 
Debt Issued/ 
Net Assets 
 
 
(5) 
 
Change in 
Net Debt/ 
Net Assets 
 
(6) 
Constant, α 0.384* 0.149 0.230* 0.645 0.033 0.666 
(std. err) (0.051) (0.141) (0.065) (0.489) (0.067) (0.508) 
Difference, βTO 
(   
       ) 
0.264 1.105* 0.045* 0.509* 0.098 1.025* 
(std. err) (0.195) (0.011) (0.004) (0.009) (0.075) (0.086) 
Confidence Interval (-0.124; 0.653) (1.081; 1.128) (0.038; 0.053) (0.489; 0.529) (-0.051; 0.246) (0.852; 1.197) 
SIZE_DIFF, β24 -0.169 -0.066 -0.781*** -1.037 0.170 0.115 
(std. err) (0.208) (0.095) (0.392) (0.813) (0.207) (0.092) 
IT_DIFF, β25 . . . . -0.223 -0.630* 
(std. err) . . . . (0.194) (0.024) 
R2 within 0.304 0.598 0.180 0.855 0.201 0.831 
R
2
 between 0.842 0.001 0.041 0.562 0.717 0.046 
R2 overall 0.148 0.445 0.130 0.809 0.100 0.771 
N 510 156 148 91 658 247 
* = significant at 1% level,       ** = significant at 5% level,      *** = significant at 10% level 
5.2.1. MINING INDUSTRY 
Both Panel A and B of Table 5 provide us with a significant target adjustment coefficients for the 
dependent variable change in net debt (see column (2) for each panel) for the mining industry. 
However, we reject the null hypothesis of the estimated coefficient following a mean reverting 
process. The confidence interval of the coefficient is above zero, indicating that we have a mean 
reverting process. Further, the confidence interval is above unity which may show that there are 
no adjustment costs for the mining industry in Canada. 
The interaction effect of size, where small firms are the reference group, show no significance 
estimates (column (1) and (2)) and therefore we cannot interpret the value.  
5.2.2. SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
Panel A of Table 5 provides us with robust results for the software industry when Target 1 is a 
proxy for the optimal debt level. The estimated target adjustment coefficient is significant and lies 
within the theoretical interval that is required for the mean reverting model, 0<β<1. However, 
the dependent variable debt issued has a low value of 0.025, in comparison to Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) that present a significant value of 0.3. Column (4) provides a significant coefficient 
of 0.485 which is closer to their study. Panel A, column (3), debt issued as a dependent variable has 
an R squared value of 0.133, which is close to the results of Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999). 
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The R squared values for column (2) and (4) (Panel A) equals 0.581 and 0.784, which is higher 
than the value of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and might indicate spurious data.     
Surprisingly, Target 2 (see Panel B of Table 5) for software industry also has significant 
coefficients of 0.045 and 0.509 (see column (3) and (4)) and it is within the 95% confidence 
interval zero to unity, which deviates from the study by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). They 
did not have any significant estimates for the rolling average of debt ratio as a proxy for the 
target.   
As predicted Target 1 have a constant that is close to zero for dependent variable change in net debt, 
which is also found in earlier research by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Auerbach (1985) and 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984). This result indicates that firms in the sample do not operate below 
their optimal debt level.   
We conclude that the adjustment target model is robust and statistically significant for software 
industries in Canada irrespective of what dependent variable we use. Our results show that there 
is a speed of adjustment towards a targeted debt level within this industry. 
Target 2 in Panel B of Table 5 column (3), dependent variable debt issued show significant values 
for the interaction effect of size. The coefficient is significant at ten percent level. This result 
indicates that there is a significant difference between small and large software firms. Large firms 
tend to have a much lower coefficient than small firms, the difference in size coefficient equals 
minus 0.781, and thereby large software firms have a target adjustment coefficient that is below 
zero. The hypothesis states that the coefficient needs to be larger than zero in order to have a 
mean reverting process. If not, the theory implies that there is no movement towards it optimal 
debt level. Due to these findings there might be reason to state that small software firms follow 
the theory better than large firms. Small software firms, with Target 2, tend to have a movement 
towards it optimal debt level according to the trade off theory.  
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5, presents the result from the model where we include interaction 
effects for size and the specific industry. Target 1 has significant target adjustment coefficients, 
however only the regression with the dependent variable debt issued (column (5)) falls within the 
confidence interval that support the mean reverting process in trade off theory. For the same 
dependent variable, we show significant results for the interaction effect size. This result supports 
the statement earlier that small software firms has a significant higher speed of adjustment 
towards it optimal debt ratio than large firms within the software industry.  
 20 
 
Target 1 and dependent variable change in debt (column (6)) show significant results for both size 
and industry as an interaction effect. This indicates that software firms support the trade off 
theory.   
Due to specific industry and country effects, we are not able to make wider conclusions for other 
industries or countries 
5.2.3. ANALYSIS TRADE OFF THEORY 
We have found some significant evidence that firms, software in particular, seem to adjust 
towards a targeted debt ratio in order to maintain an optimal capital structure and the adjustment 
target model were used. On the other hand, we also present some result that does not give 
support for the theory, this is in line with the result by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch 
(2004). They reject that firms have a mean reverting process towards a targeted debt level.  
When analysing the trade off theory, the most important information we are given concerns the 
coefficient. A significant coefficient determined by a mean reverting process indicates the speed 
of adjustment. According to Graham and Harvey (2001), 81% of the firms strive to reach their 
optimal debt level at all times and the optimal debt level demonstrate that there is a trade off 
between tax benefits and costs of debt (Frank and Goyal, 2007). If the firm deviates from the 
targeted optimal debt level it adjusts its debt ratio by debt issuance or debt reduction. However, 
this adjustment is followed by a transaction cost which might explain the speed of adjustment; in 
order to have low costs of adjustment and instantanious adjustment towards the optimum debt 
ratio, the significant coefficent equals unity. A coefficent above 0.3 is suggested to be a quite 
quick speed of adjustment according to Dang (2011) and Flannery and Rangan (2004). 
The literature presents many studies that test the model on US firms and the overall findings are 
that firms in the US tend to have a quite low speed of adjustment. Similar to the US, Canada is a 
market-based economy, thus we expect the speed of adjustment coefficients to be low. Contrary, 
Germany and France are bank-based economies and have higher overall coefficients according to 
Dang (2011). He claims that firms in bank-based countries are assumed to have a closer 
relationship with banks and acquiring debt faster and to a lower cost. Altogether, lower costs of 
debt should lead to a high speed of adjustment to the optimal debt level, whereas a low speed of 
adjustment with the coefficient close to zero, might indicate a higher costs of debt.   
Overall, small firms tend to grow at a higher rate than large firms. According to Alti (2004), the 
growth rate could affect the consistency of the theory where fast growing companies have 
reduced cost of adjusting to their optimal debt. In order to conclude why small software firms in 
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our sample tend to follow the theory more accurately than large firms, one approach might be to 
check if small software companies have high growth rates or at least higher growth rates than 
large firms in the software and mining industries. This might be a subject for further research.   
According to earlier studies, there are two important variables that are used as a proxy for the 
target optimum debt level. First, we use a proxy of historical average of the debt ratio, which we 
expect to have a significant result as this is what has previously been found. Second, a rolling 
average of the debt ratio does not provide us with significant results in the literature. (Shyam-
Sunders and Myers, 1999)  
There is two approaches for modeling the trade off theory. The static adjustment model, used in 
this study and the dynamic model, which uses lags and therefore is more sensitive to changes. 
Accordning to Dang (2011), estimations done with a dynamic process delivers a more accurate 
outcome than the static model. On the other hand, it is appropriate to test a static model against 
the pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Therefore, it is essential to know the 
purpose of the modeling beforehand in order to chose an appropriate approach.     
To determine the robustness of the trade off theory in general, we should analyse the period 
when corporate tax was introduced to Canada in 1917. Only then can we really understand and 
get strong evidence of how well the trade off theory describes the capital structure of a firm.  
5.3. THE PECKING ORDER THEORY  
By following the methodology by Frank and Goyal (2003), the pecking order theory is tested. 
Test results for the pecking order theory model specification are presented in three tables: Table 
6 – Aggregated model, Table 7 – Aggregated model with size and firm dummies and Table 8 – 
Disaggregated model. In Appendix, additional results, correlation tables and a list of firms are 
presented. 
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Table 6: Pecking Order Tests on Aggregated Model 
Mining and software industries. The sample period is 1990-2011. The estimated regression is:         
                                    , where the dependent variable,     , has two definitions; long-term 
debt issued (long-term debt issuance – long-term debt reduction) and total debt issued (long-term + short-term debt). 
      is the financial deficit (dividends + investments + change in working capital – internal cash flow). 1990 is the 
base year and, 1991, 1992, …, 2011 are year dummies for the years 1991 to 2011. All variables are in book value. 
Definitions are taken from Datastream. The tests are estimated with an Ordinary Least Square fixed-effects panel 
regression. All variables are deflated by yearly Canadian inflation rates reported by Bank of Canada.  
 
 Aggregated Model 
Industry                                  Software Industry Mining Industry Both Industries 
Variable Long-term Debt 
Issued 
 
(1) 
 
Total Debt Issued 
 
 
(2) 
Long-term Debt 
Issued 
 
(3) 
Total Debt Issued 
 
 
(4) 
Long-term Debt 
Issued 
 
(5) 
Total Debt Issued 
 
 
(6) 
Constant,   -54484.83* -43953.82* -422.339 -639.512 -2708.52 -2726.121 
(robust std. err) (6186.019) (5330.202) (1604.214) (1875.583) (3376.076) (3107.359) 
DEF,     0.152* -0.026 0.230** 0.203** 0.160* 0.061 
(robust std. err) (0.023) (0.033) (0.092) (0.098) (0.051) (0.084) 
N 214 215 715 716 929 931 
R2 (overall) 0.027 0.055 0.227 0.148 0.034 0.008 
R2 (between) 0.810 0.115 0.476 0.499 0.163 0.054 
R2 (within) 0.073 0.063 0.173 0.101 0.054 0.022 
H0: βPO =1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* = significant at 1% level,       ** = significant at 5% level,      *** = significant at 10% level 
 
As can be seen in Table 6, the results from fixed-effects panel regression do not provide any 
strong support for the theory for software firms, independent of what dependent variable is used 
(                   ). Earlier, we predicted the constants to be zero under the pecking 
order theory; this hypothesis is rejected at a one percent significance level by the software firm 
sample, which further emphasize that this part of our sample does not support the theory. A 
significant, negative coefficient, as we have in all regressions for software firms in tables 6-8, 
indicates that those firms constantly cover their deficits with some other type of financing than 
debt. Their debt levels are persistently below those of their deficits.  
The major consequence with using un-scaled variables is that the constants are very large and not 
comparable to those of Frank and Goyal (2003) and Syam-Sunder and Myers (1999), as they use 
only scaled variables. However, we are only interested in if the constant is significantly different 
from zero and not its absolute value, so this does not affect our interpretations or conclusions. 
The mining industry does provide some support for the theory (                   ), similar 
to the results reported by Frank and Goyal (2003) with deficit coefficients of around 0.2 and 
insignificant constant values. The pecking order hypothesis of the financial deficit being covered 
by an equally large increase in debt,         , is however rejected using a Wald’s test at a one 
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percent significance level for all regressions, columns (1) to (6). The R squared is low, ranging 
from 0,063 to 0,173, for the regressions where the sample of mining industry has a higher R 
squared than the software sample. However, it is not lower than for other similar studies with 
gaps permitted in the relevant cash flows.  
All regressions in this report have been run with both scaled and un-scaled variables, but only the 
scaled variable regressions are reported. Observing the sign and magnitude of the correlations 
between the scaled key variables (see Appendix A1.2) there seem to be problems with 
multicollinearity in the software industry sample; investments and change in working capital for 
instance have a correlation of 0.993 compared to -0.044 when the variables are left unscaled. This 
could be the reason that the regressions with scaled variables get abnormally high R squares 
(0.9<) and we have a problem with spurious data, which supports our decision to only use un-
scaled variables. Using robust standard errors also reduces our need for scaling.  
Table 7: Pecking Order Tests on Aggregated Model with Size and Firm Dummies 
Mining and software industries. The sample period is 1990-2011. The estimated regression is:         
                                                                    , where 
the dependent variable,     , has two definitions; long-term debt issued (long-term debt issuance – long-term debt 
reduction) and total debt issued (long-term + short-term debt).       is the financial deficit (dividends + investments + 
change in working capital – internal cash flow).      is a size dummy where the reference group is small firms with 
average net assets above 40 000 Canadian Dollar.    is an industry dummy where the mining industry is the reference 
group. The interaction variables          and        are the dummy variables multiplied by deficit. 1990 is the base 
year and 1991, 1992, …, 2011 are year dummies for years 1991 to 2011. All variables are in book value. Definitions are 
taken from Datastream. The tests are estimated with an Ordinary Least Square fixed-effects panel regression.  All 
variables are deflated by yearly Canadian inflation rates reported by Bank of Canada.  
  
 Aggregated Model with Size and Firm Dummies 
Industry                                  Software Industry Mining Industry  Both Industries 
Variable Long-term debt 
issued 
 
(1) 
Total debt issued 
 
 
(2) 
 
Long-term debt 
issued 
 
(3) 
Total debt issued 
 
 
(4) 
Long-term debt 
issued 
 
(5) 
Total debt issued 
 
 
(6) 
Constant,   -55074.4* -44567.88* -227.351 -980.987 -2863.994 -1642.095 
(robust std. err) (7284.483) (5189.5) (1514.829) (179614) (3176.053) (2830.45) 
DEF,     0.410 0.255 -0.006 -0.041** -0.008 -0.037 
(robust std. err) (0.505) (0.520) (0.029) (0.018) (0.044) (0.031) 
SIZE_DEF,    -0.258 -0.291 0.264* 0.272** 0.250** 0.255** 
(robust std. err) (0.487) (0.530) (0.029) (0.107) (0.097) (0.100) 
IT_DEF,    . . . . -0.134 -0.283* 
(robust std. err) . . . . (0.099) (0.106) 
N 214 215 715 716 929 931 
R2 (overall) 0.027 0.054 0.247 0.166 0.057 0.073 
R2 (between) 0.738 0.072 0.502 0.523 0.335 0.470 
R2 (within) 0.073 0.064 0.194 0.117 0.063 0.049 
H0: βPO =1 
H0: Β3 =1 
0.256 
0.017 
0.167 
0.024 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
* = significant at 1% level,       ** = significant at 5% level,      *** = significant at 10% level 
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Pecking order theory builds on the assumption of an information asymmetry on the market 
where firms with high information asymmetry, such as small firms, have larger incitement to use 
debt instead of equity (Helwege and Liang, 1996). When testing the hypothesis this does not 
however seem to be the case for the mining industry. The interaction coefficients for large 
mining firms are positive and significant for the mining industry. Subsequently, large firms offer 
greater support for the theory than small firms in the mining industry. The hypothesis        
  is however rejected at a one percent significance level.  
None of the deficit coefficients for the software industry are significant in table 7. However, the 
hypothesis of a deficit coefficient equal to zero cannot be rejected at a ten percent significance 
level for small firms in the industry. This is the opposite of the results from the mining industry 
and the industries thus do not display the same tendency.  
Table 8: Pecking Order Tests on Disaggregated Model 
Mining and software industries. The sample period is 1990-2011. The estimated regression is:          
                                                        , where:     , has two definitions; long-
term debt issued (long-term debt issuance – long-term debt reduction) and total debt issued (long-term + short-term 
debt).       is cash dividends paid,     is the investments,      is the change in working capital and      the internal cash flow. 
1990 is the base year and 1991, 1992, …, 2011 are year dummies for years 1991 to 2011. All variables are in book 
value. Definitions are taken from DataStream. The tests are estimated with an Ordinary Least Square fixed-effects 
panel regression. All variables are deflated by yearly Canadian inflation rates reported by Bank of Canada.  
 
 Disaggregated Model 
Industry                                  Software Industry  Mining Industry Both Industries 
Variable Long-term Debt 
Issued 
 
(1) 
Total Debt Issued 
 
 
(2) 
 
Long-term Debt 
Issued 
 
(3) 
Total Debt Issued 
 
 
(4) 
Long-term Debt 
Issued 
 
(5) 
Total Debt Issued 
 
 
(6) 
Constant,   -62921.18* -36798.08* -788.648 -297.862 -2826.183 -2730.611 
(robust std. err) (13920.68) (7776.399) (1011.289) (1699.127) (3593.629) (3550.922) 
DIV,    0.798 -0.349 0.313 -0.079 0.147 -0.344 
(robust std. err) (0.622) (0.479) (0.487) (0.551) (0.198) (0.368) 
I,    0.815* 2.090* 0.282** 0.226 0.236 0.148 
(robust std. err) (0.225) (0.688) (0.128) (0.139) (0.116) (0.158) 
Δ wc,    0.052 -0.257 0.221*** 0.205 0.151*** 0.050 
(robust std. err) (0.085) (0.219) (0.115) (0.148) (0.086) (0.149) 
IC,    -0.287* -0.280** -0.215*** -0.151 -0.154* -0.053 
(robust std. err) (0.071) (0.123) (0.127) (0.102) (0.039) (0.037) 
N 214 215 715 716 929 931 
R2 (overall) 0.024 0.081 0.223 0.144 0.040 0.018 
R2 (between) 0.835 0.038 0.419 0.428 0.175 0.102 
R2 (within) 0.079 0.098 0.178 0.104 0.056 0.025 
        
         
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* = significant at 1% level,       ** = significant at 5% level,      *** = significant at 10% level 
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In the theoretical section, assumptions on the components of the independent variable financial 
deficit were made. To justify the aggregation step the disaggregated model is tested to evaluate 
the impact of each component on financial deficit. As can be seen in Table 8, the disaggregated 
model has approximately the same R squares and subsequently the same explanatory power as 
the aggregated model.  
The null hypothesis,                 , of all independent variables having a one-to-
one impact on the dependent variable, is statistically rejected at a one percent significance level 
for all regressions in Table 7, which has been tested with Wald tests. The results in column (1) are 
quite supportive of the aggregation step. However, the other columns do not offer such 
compelling support. Frank and Goyal (2003) found equal weak support and our coefficients are 
similar to theirs both in sign and magnitude when they allow for gaps in reported cash flow data. 
Increases in investments have a positive impact on debt issuance, as do changes in working 
capital which may be due to timing issues. When firms borrow money these are usually deposited 
into bank accounts before being used and this increases working capital in the short-run. 
Dividends have a positive impact on the dependent variable long-term debt issuance, but 
negative impact on total debt, i.e. short- and long-term debt issuance. Frank and Goyal (2003) 
and Fama and French (2002) found that dividend-paying firms generally issue and pay back less 
long-term debt than non-dividend-paying firms. This explains the different signs on the dividend 
coefficient. Internal cash flow is expected to have a negative impact on debt issuance and this is 
also the case for all regressions in Table 8.  
5.3.1. ANALYSIS PECKING ORDER THEORY 
The mining industry does offer support for the theory, even if it is substantially weaker than the 
theory predicts, whereas the software industry does not offer any statistically and economically 
significant support. The reason for this could be higher level of tangible assets in the mining 
industry which could be used as collateral when taking new loans and thus decrease the cost of 
debt (Helwege and Liang, 1996). Solid evidence of what causes this difference between the 
industries can naturally not be supplied, which simply makes us able to speculate of the reasons 
behind it.  
Leary and Roberts (2010) found similarly weak support for the pecking order theory in their 
samples as we did for the software industry and no indication of firms’ avoiding external 
financing. Even for samples where the pecking order should perform well, they failed find 
significant support. However, there are a compelling number of studies that speak in favor of the 
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theory and find stronger support than we did for the mining industry (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2003 
and Graham and Harvey, 2001).  
The support for the theory seems to be time variant as well. During the 1980’s it appears firms 
act more according to pecking order theory than in the later decades (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
Our sample covers the time period after 1990 where the general trend is for firms not to support 
the theory.  
Numerous studies provide empirical evidence on the negative market reaction that does follow 
an announcement of equity issuance, which provides support for the rationale behind the theory 
(Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Asquith and Mullins, 1986). There is a possibility that firms act on 
this knowledge and refrain from issuing equity as a first financing option. A competing theory 
called market-timing theory suggests that firms may at times avoid equity financing, but what 
determines capital structure is the market’s current attitude towards different financing options. 
The firm does not have a preference on what financing to use, but instead follows the markets 
opinion and chooses the financing alternative which is most favored by the market at the time 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Both theories could hold if markets have a persistently bad attitude 
towards equity financing, even if the rationale behind them differs. It is therefore difficult to 
determine what drives observed behavior.  
There is also evidence that the market’s reaction to an equity issuance depends on the 
predictability of it. Thus, firms who frequently issue equity do not get the same negative market 
reaction to an issuance as those that seldom do (Smith, 1986). This behavior is further supported 
by Jansson (2000) who finds trends in financing behavior; firms who previously used equity 
financing are more likely to do so again in the future. Firms seem to be able to wipe out this 
argued information asymmetry problem by adapting a consistent financing behavior.  
Even if the current study does not provide strong empirical evidence for the theory, 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) argue that an information asymmetry may in fact exist. 
Because of the wide range of financing options available, it does not have to result in firms 
having a fixed financial hierarchy and following pecking order theory. Lemmon and Zender 
(2004) suggest that if firms’ debt capacity is uncontrolled for, we may falsely reject the theory. 
Firms may simply use equity issuance because they do not have any other option due to low debt 
capacity. The theory behind the model could thus be correct, but the model does not accurately 
predict firms’ financing decisions.  
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Large firms in the mining industry provide some support for the theory whereas small firms do 
not. This is contrary to what could be expected from the theoretical framework of the model 
(Helwege and Liang, 1996). The information asymmetry that drives the model should be larger 
for small firms since these have less available data. Brealey et al (2008, pp. 520-521) suggest that 
large firms tend to have higher debt ratios since these have greater possibilities to leverage to a 
low interest rate, thus making debt issuance an even more attractive financial alternative. Another 
explanation is brought forward by Lemmon and Zender (2004), who suggest controlling for 
firms’ debt capacity in the model. Small firms have greater debt capacity constraints than large 
firms and this could explain why large firms seem to support the theory better than small firms 
when debt capacity remains uncontrolled for. Furthermore, they find that the market reacts with 
a smaller price drop to an equity issuance by small, high-growth firms than large firms, which 
indicate that the market is aware of this debt capacity problem.  
5.4. PECKING ORDER THEORY VERSUS TRADE OFF THEORY 
The financing deficit is the only effect to take in to consideration when testing the pecking order 
theory, but if deficit is simply one of many variables that determine leverage we have a general 
version of trade off theory (Fama and French, 2002).   
Changes in debt ratios are driven by different needs in pecking order theory and trade off theory. 
In pecking order theory, the change is driven by the need for external financing when internal 
funds are exhausted. While trade off theory is driven by costs an benefits of leverage in order to 
sustain an optimal debt level (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999).  
We report results for the dependent variables: Debt Issued/Net Assets and Change in Net Debt/Net 
Assets for the trade of theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999) and Long-term debt issued and Total 
debt issued for the pecking order theory (Frank and Goyal, 2003). The results for pecking order 
theory do not differ greatly between the two dependent variables. However, the trade off theory 
have inconsistent results between the dependent variables. This might be because the net debt 
variable includes short-term debt. We are mainly interested in long-term debt and how the capital 
structure changes over longer periods of time and not short-term adjustments.  
One of the conclusions of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is that the trade off theory outcomes 
might be statistically significant while the pecking order theory results are not. We could thus end 
up with significant results that are false for the trade off theory and commit a type two error. 
Therefore, we need to be cautious when interpreting the results for the adjustment process.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we have tested two of the most important theories within capital structure, pecking 
order and trade off theories, on mining and software industries in Canada. The results offer weak 
support for the pecking order theory on both industries. On the other hand, trade off tests show 
statistically and economically significant results for the software industry. The mining industry 
does not follow the static trade off theory. Overall, our results cannot be used to draw any wider 
conclusions of the applicability of the two theories/industries. We contribute with a new 
approach to tests for size effects by including a size variable in the model.      
In order to get a better understanding of why small firms tend to adjust quicker to the optimal 
debt ratio, tests controlling for more variables such as growth could to be done. Also, since the 
trade off theory stresses the influence of a tax shield, it would be of interest to test if the tax rate 
has an effect on the capital structure decisions. 
It would be interesting to control for the government ownership because there is a possibility 
that it affects the firm debt capacity, which in turn should increase the robustness of the pecking 
order theory.  
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APPENDIX 
A1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variables retrieved from Datastream with definitions taken from Thomson (2007) as follows: 
Cash: 
(WC02003) CASH represents money available for use in the normal operations of the company. 
It is the most liquid of all of the company's assets. 
 
Deferred taxes: 
(WC03263) DEFERRED TAXES represent the accumulation of taxes which are deferred as a 
result of timing differences between reporting sales and expenses for tax and financial reporting 
purposes. 
 
Dividends,    : 
(WC04551) CASH DIVIDENDS PAID – TOTAL represent the total common and preferred 
dividends paid to shareholders of the company. Excludes dividends paid to minority 
shareholders. 
 
Internal cash flow,   : 
(WC04860) NET CASH FLOW - OPERATING ACTIVITIES represent the net cash receipts 
and disbursements resulting from the operations of the company. It is the sum of Funds from 
Operations, Funds From/Used for Other Operating Activities and Extraordinary Items. Data for 
this field is generally not available prior to 1989. 
 
Investments,  : 
(WC04601) CAPITAL EXPENDITURES represent the funds used to acquire fixed assets other 
than those associated with acquisitions. 
 
Long-term debt,  : 
(WC03251) LONG TERM DEBT represents all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding 
amounts due within one year. It is shown net of premium or discount. 
 
Minority interest: 
(WC03426) MINORITY INTEREST represents the non-cash adjustment to income for profits 
attributable to interests in subsidiaries held outside the group.  
 
Working capital,  : 
(WC03151) WORKING CAPITAL represents the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities. It is a measure of liquidity and solvency. 
 
Total assets: 
(WC02999) TOTAL ASSETS represent the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment 
and other assets. 
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Total capital: 
(WC03998) TOTAL CAPITAL represents the total investment in the company. It is the sum of 
common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, long-term debt, non-equity reserves and 
deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. For insurance companies policyholders' equity is also 
included. 
 
Total debt,  : 
(WC03255) TOTAL DEBT represents all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations. It is 
the sum of long and short term debt. 
A2. FIRM NAMES 
A2.1. Software Firms 
1. 01 Communique Lab 
2. Absolute Software 
3. Catamaran Corp 
4. CGI Group Inc 
5. Computer Modelling 
6. Constellation Soft 
7. Criticalcontrol Sol 
8. Cyberplex Inc 
9. Descartes Systems Gr 
10. Enghouse Systems Lim 
11. Espial Group Inc 
12. Guestlogix Inc 
13. Hartco Inc 
14. Intrinsyc Software 
15. Mediagrif Interactive 
16. Nexj Systems Inc 
17. Northcore Tech Inc 
18. PNI Digital Media 
19. Redknee Solut 
20. Softchoice Corp 
21. Tecsys Inc 
22. Terago Inc 
 
A2.2. Mining Firms 
1. Aberdeen Inter 
2. Alacer Gold Corp 
3. Alamos Gold Inc. 
4. Alderon Iron 
5. Almeden Minerals 
6. American Bonanza 
7. Americas Bullion 
8. Anaconda Mining 
9. Aquila resources 
10. Argonaut Gold Inc. 
11. Asanko Gold Inc. 
12. Atna Resources Ltd 
13. Augusta Resrc Corp 
14. Aura Minerals 
15. Aurico Gold 
16. Aurizon Mines 
17. Avnel Gold min 
18. B2gold corp 
19. Banro Corporation 
20. Besra Gold Inc 
21. Braeval Mining 
22. Brigus Gold Corp 
23. Caledonia Mining 
24. Canada Lithium Corp 
25. Canarc Resources Corp 
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26. Candente Gold Corp 
27. Canickel 
28. Cardero Resrc Corp 
29. Carlisle Goldfield 
30. Carpathian Gold Inc 
31. Centerra Gold Inc  
32. Champion Iron Mines 
33. Chieftain Metals Inc  
34. China Gold Inter  
35. Claude Resources Inc  
36. Cline Mining Corp 
37. Continental Precious 
38. Continental Gold Ltd 
39. Coro Mining Corp 
40. Corvus Gold 
41. Crocodile Gold Corp 
42. Crosshair Energ 
43. Dalradian Resources 
44. Delrand Res 
45. Detour Gold Corp 
46. Diamond Fields Intl 
47. Dominion Diamond Corp 
48. Duluth Metals Ltd 
49. Dundee Precious 
50. Dynacor Gold Mines 
51. Dynasty Metals 
52. Eastern Platinum Ltd 
53. Eco Oro Min 
54. Eldorado Gold Corp 
55. Elgin Mining 
56. Endeavour Mining 
57. Endeavour Silver 
58. Entrée Gold Inc 
59. Evolving Gold Corp 
60. Excellon Resrcs 
61. Exeter Resource Corp 
62. Far Resources Ltd 
63. First Majestic 
64. First Point Minerals 
65. Forsys Metals Corp 
66. Fortuna Silver 
67. Fortune Minerals Ltd 
68. Freegold Ventures 
69. Frontier Rare 
70. Gabriel Resources 
71. Geologix Expl 
72. Globex Mining 
73. Gogold Resource 
74. Golden Queen Mining 
75. Gran Columbia 
76. Gryphon Gold Corp 
77. Guyana Goldfields 
78. Harte Gold Corp 
79. Iamgold Corp 
80. IC Potash Corp 
81. Intl Minerals Corp 
82. International Tower 
83. Ivanplats 
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A3. OTHER TABLES 
Table A1: Correlation Between Scaled Key Variables – Pecking Order Model 
Mining and software industries. Correlation between scaled key variables in pecking order theory. The sample 
period is 1990-2011.  
Table A1.1: Mining Industry 
Mining industry        
 Dividends/Net 
assets 
Investments/Net 
assets 
Δ Working 
capital/Net 
assets 
Internal cash 
flow/Net assets 
Deficit/Net 
assets 
Long-term 
debt 
issued/Net 
assets 
Total debt 
issued/Net 
assets 
Dividends/Net 
assets 
1       
Investments/Net 
assets 
0,117 1      
Δ Working 
capital/Net assets 
-0,009 -0,096 1     
Internal cash 
flow/Net assets 
0,073 -0,077 0,640 1,00    
Deficit/Net assets -0,036 0,288 0,370 -0,438 1,00   
Net debt 
issued/Net assets 
0,012 0,314 0,065 -0,040 0,214 1,00  
Total debt 
issued/net assets 
0,007 0,386 0,016 -0,018 0,157 0,755 1,00 
 
Table A1.2: Software Industry 
Software industry        
 Dividends/Net 
assets 
Investments/Net 
assets 
Δ Working 
capital/Net 
assets 
Internal cash 
flow/Net assets 
Deficit/Net 
assets 
Long-term 
debt 
issued/Net 
assets 
Total debt 
issued/Net 
assets 
Dividends/Net 
assets 
1       
Investments/Net 
assets 
0,014 1      
Δ Working 
capital/Net assets 
0,015 0,993 1     
Internal cash 
flow/Net assets 
0,033 0,687 0,707 1,00    
Deficit/Net assets -0,028 -0,107 -0,129 -0,793 1,00   
Long-term 
issued/Net assets 
-0,016 0,289 0,262 -0,484 0,905 1,00  
Total debt 
issued/Net assets 
0,019 -0,294 -0,267 0,485 -0,911 -0,974 1,00 
 
Table A2: Correlation – Trade Off Model 
Table A2.1: Correlation between Variables in the Mining Industry 
Mining Correlation  Difference 1 Difference 2 Debt Issued/Net Assets Change in Net Debt/Net 
Assets 
Difference 1 1.000    
Difference 2 0.966 1.000   
Debt Issued/Net Assets -0.778 -0.750 1.000  
Change in Net Debt/Net Assets 0.664 0.660 -0.513 1.000 
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Table A2.2 Correlation between Variables in the Software Industry 
Software Correlation  Difference 1 Difference 2 Debt Issued/Net Assets Change in Net Debt/ Net 
Assets 
Difference 1 1.000    
Difference 2 0.988 1.000   
Debt Issued/Net Assets 0.028 0.128 1.000  
Change in Net Debt/ Net 
Assets 
0.804 0.862 0.559 1.000 
 
Table A3: Yearly Canadian Inflation Rates in Percent 
Year Inflation rate (%) 
1990 4,80 
1991 5,60 
1992 1,50 
1993 1,90 
1994 2,00 
1995 2,10 
1996 1,60 
1997 1,60 
1998 1,00 
1999 1,70 
2000 2,70 
2001 2,50 
2002 2,30 
2003 2,80 
2004 1,90 
2005 2,20 
2006 2,00 
2007 2,10 
2008 2,40 
2009 0,30 
2010 1,80 
2011 2,90 
Source: Bank of Canada 
 
